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1. Introduction 
If given the unfortunate choice, you should impose a risk of moderate harm on an individual 
rather than a risk of death, other things equal. That’s because moderate harm is better for 
someone than death. This relation holds under uncertainty: risking moderate harm is better for 
someone than risking their death, keeping likelihoods constant. After all, if your parachute 
might fail, would you rather jump from a height that will leave you with chronic moderate pain 
you if it fails or one that will kill you if it does?

However, the relationship between two special cases of harm and death — namely, of prenatal 
harm and abortion — seems different. For example, suppose that an expectant early-term 
mother  must choose between two treatments to save her life. The first risks harming the fetus 2
so that it will suffer chronic moderate pain through adulthood. The second will terminate the 
pregnancy. Given these details, it seems that the mother may choose either treatment. But this 
conflicts with the idea sketched above that harm is preferable to death. Similarly, a mother 
addicted to a fetus-harming intoxicant may terminate her pregnancy if she knows severe 
relapse is in her future even if the intoxicant’s harm is better for the fetus than death. Prenatal 
harms therefore often seem objectionable in a way that other harms are not. The challenge is to 
explain why.

This paper begins by rehearsing and criticizing some rival answers to this question, focusing on 
McMahan (2006). It then identifies structural similarities between key cases of prenatal harm 
and the recently characterized ‘all-or-nothing’ problem from Horton (2017; c.f., 2019). These 
similarities extend Horton’s solution to the problem to the explanatory challenge posed by 
prenatal harm. According to Horton, roughly, a willingness to make sacrifices is a condition of 
bearing certain obligations. I argue that extending this solution to the challenge above implies 
that a willingness to parent incurs a defeasible duty to protect the fetus from harm. This 
argument has broader implications. It provides independent support for so-called ‘voluntarist’ 
accounts of parental role obligations according to which, roughly, a person’s autonomous 
choice to parent a child suffices for having the obligations distinctive of parenting that child.

2. Stage-Setting 
 Thanks to participants of the CSU Long Beach Applied Ethics Forum for helpful discussion.1
 I stipulatively use ‘mother’ to mean ‘person who is pregnant’. Likewise, when I use ‘woman’, it is in its 2
sex-denoting, not gender-denoting, sense, which differ extensionally.
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Questions about the morality of prenatal harm figure prominently in recent discussion in this 
very journal, owing largely to Hendricks (2018). Perry Hendricks defends the Impairment 
Argument against abortion. Death, it seems, is worse for the fetus than some prenatal harms 
such as fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS). Hendricks mobilizes the intuitions underlying this claim 
to advance an argument like the following: 
3
(1) If prenatal harm is wrong, then, other things equal, abortion is wrong. 

(2) Prenatal harm is wrong.

(3) Therefore, other things equal, abortion is wrong.

Philosophers have criticized the argument for missing the moral significance of maternal 
autonomy. In particular, Claire Pickard (2020) and Dustin Crummett (2020) argue that this failure 
considerably weakens the argument's conclusion.  As Pickard puts it, “Often, in cases of 4
unwanted pregnancy, a woman wishes to assert bodily autonomy simply in order to not have 
another entity growing inside her. If the goal is to rid one’s uterus of an unwelcome visitor, then 
it is reasonable to say that the woman is upholding her “bodily autonomy” in choosing to 
abort” (Pickard 2020: 209). Since a woman’s assertion of her autonomy is a moral good, 
Hendricks’s ceteris paribus clause is often not met. In such cases, Hendricks’ argument for the 
prohibition of abortion simply does not apply.

Similarly, Crummett argues that “carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term is far more 
burdensome than is abstaining from excessive drinking for nine months, [which is] a morally 
important difference” (Crummett 2020: 215). Since most terminated pregnancies are 
terminated because they are unwanted, Hendricks’s argument is thus much weaker than it first 
appears, failing to demonstrate that abortion is wrong in most cases.

However, premise (2) in Hendricks’s argument is comparatively less disputed. It’s not hard to 
see why. David Wasserman offers a  particularly vivid illustration: 
Consider [a woman who] loves contact sports, and continues to participate despite her 
intention to bear the fetus and her knowledge that those sports place it at grave risk of 
impairment. […] She smashes into an opponent in a particularly rough game, severely 
injuring her fetus. […] This case, then, seems to fracture our moral appraisal: if the 
woman does what is better for the fetus, she will have done something wrong; and 
worse than what she would do if she did what was worse for the fetus and aborted. 
(Wasserman 2005: 27)

Wasserman's protagonist is open to genuine moral criticism; recklessly injuring her fetus 
seems clearly wrong. But the woman would not be open to similar criticism for choosing to 
abort the fetus. This is puzzling if risking moderate harm is generally preferable to risking death. 

Stepping back from these claims reveals the puzzle: prenatal harm, at least of the kind 
considered here, is better for the fetus than death. And the woman in Wasserman’s story has 
the “intention to bear the fetus”, so it does not obviously impinge on her autonomy. How then 
could injuring the fetus be wrong when aborting it isn’t?

 Hendricks focuses on a specific case of prenatal harm: fetal alcohol syndrome. According to his 3
conditional premise, “If causing O to have FAS is immoral then, ceteris paribus, killing O is immoral” and 
he includes the claim that aborting O is killing O as a separate premise. See Hendricks (2018: 248). 
 Blackshaw and Hendricks (2020) reply to Crummett’s criticism. Crummett (Forthcoming) rebuts their 4
reply. 
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There are three pieces to this puzzle. In many cases of pregnancy:

(4) Abortion is permissible. 

(5) Pre-natal harm is impermissible.

(6) Pre-natal harm is better for the fetus than abortion.

I am not suggesting that (4-6) are inconsistent. The challenge is, rather, to explain how they 
hang together, as they appear to in the competent judgments of many ordinary moral agents. 
In particular, the main challenge is to explain why (5) and (4) are often both true. I’ll focus on (5). 
Although I assume in what follows (4), it’s worth mentioning why the assumption is credible. I’m 
concerned with harms that occur before the fetus acquires the qualities in virtue of which they 
are persons. As McMahan (2001) and Boonin (2002) comprehensively argue, inter magna alia, 
it’s overwhelmingly plausible that young fetuses lack intrinsic moral status as persons. As non-
persons, these fetuses make only weak moral claims. Consequently, abortion is permissible 
when the reasons for terminating the pregnancy, most often originating in maternal autonomy, 
outweigh the relatively weak claims of the fetus.

(5) is part of common-sense morality. But reflecting on (4) and (6) might lead one to doubt it. 
Indeed, Flanigan (2020) defends the general permissibility of prenatal harm while granting “that 
it is counterintuitive to claim that mothers who take serious risks while pregnant act within their 
rights and are not required to do otherwise” (12). Part of her argument relies on the idea that 
pregnancy is supererogatory. As we will see, this claim is limited in certain central cases.

I endorse the following explanation of (5). Because the fetus lacks that quality, whatever it is, 
that makes you and me genuine persons, it has weaker claims against death and harm than it 
will when it becomes a child.  Aborting the fetus is therefore permissible if the mother wishes, 5
since its claim to life is weaker than the mother’s claim to bodily autonomy. However, if the 
fetus suffers culpable prenatal injury it will have a strong claim against harm against the person 
who harmed it when the fetus becomes a person.  Prenatal injury therefore leads to a serious 6
future complaint; a moral criticism that the fetus is not yet in a position to offer but will be soon 
enough. Abortion, however, does not lead to a serious future complaint. Thus, prenatal harm is 
often wrong in a way that abortion is not. Call this, tendentiously, the Right Explanation.

To restrict discussion to a manageable scope, the kind of pre-natal harm discussed, unless 
stated otherwise, is chronic pain of various degrees. When I speak of prenatal injury, the 
 Several accounts of why fetuses lack the full moral status of persons have been advances. Since 5
nothing below depends on the details of which account is true, I’ll avoid committing myself to any such 
explanation in particular. For example, Shiffrin (1999) denies that fetuses have autonomy, so she denies 
that they have non-derivative moral status. They have only derivative moral status in virtue of their 
connection the child that they will become. Similarly, Harman (1999) defends the Actual Future Principle 
according to which “an early fetus that will become a person has some moral status. An early fetus that 
will die while it is still an early fetus has no moral status” (311); Boonin (2002) argues that fetuses lack the 
dispositional desires that underly a right to life.
 One way to justify this claim is to establish that the fetus is numerically identical with the person it will 6
become. But weaker relations between the fetus and the child it will become appear to suffice. For 
example, Shiffrin (1999) writes, “If our actions now set into motion causal chains that will result in a 
right’s being violated in the future, this action is, at best, morally problematic” (138). So long as the fetus 
bears the appropriate causal relations to the child, harm done to the fetus is answerable to later claims 
from the child.
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morally relevant result of such injury is chronic pain.  Since chronic pain is plainly a harm, I 7
needn’t commit to a particular explanation of why experiencing pain is harmful or intrinsically 
bad. Pain is bad, it might seem, because of the way it feels.  Or it may be, as Shiffrin contends, 8
that painful feelings are only derivatively bad because they cause the more fundamental bad of 
bringing “about a cleavage between a person’s life and her will.”  Or perhaps pain is something 9
to which people are necessarily constitutionally averse. Experiencing pain, therefore, frustrates 
a universal desire and the frustration of one’s desires is intrinsically bad for an individual.  My 10
claims are compatible with each of these positions.

2. The Problem of Abortion as Remedy to Prenatal Injury 
2.1 Three and Two Choices 
The Right Explanation is controversial. In particular, some are concerned that it implies that 
“abortion is an acceptable remedy to prenatal injury.”  To appreciate this concern, suppose 11
that a woman culpably or negligently harms her fetus, like Wasserman’s protagonist. She can 
either terminate the pregnancy or give birth to a moderately harmed child whose life is worth 
living but who will suffer chronic moderate pain as a result of the mother’s harm. If the mother 
gives birth, she will be liable to a serious future complaint from the child that the fetus will 
become. If she terminates the pregnancy, however, she will not be liable to such a complaint. 
Since abortion is permissible, it seems that the woman should terminate the pregnancy. Doing 
so avoids serious moral complaint, and so wrongdoing, while continued gestation does not. 
12
This concern leads some to deny that the fetus’s claim to life is always weaker than the 
mother’s claim to bodily autonomy, positing a comparatively stronger conception of fetal 
interests than the one posited by the Right Explanation. These stronger interests provide a 
bulwark against using abortion to remedy prenatal harm. As Jeff McMahan puts it, “liberals 
must not allow their justified concern to protect the rights of pregnant women from intrusive 
 Chronic pain may also be bad in a second way, not only qua harm but also qua disability, in the sense 7
expressed in the Americans with Disabilities Act of “a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of [someone’s] major life activities.” Indeed, disability may seem like a species of harm 
— Shiffrin’s account of harm implies as much. However, Barnes (2014) casts doubt on this claim. So I 
explicitly bracket moral issues that arise from the disabling consequences of chronic pain in my 
discussion below, while recognizing that we can only imperfectly bracket our intuitions about those 
consequences in the cases below.
 Bradford (2020) calls this view ‘dolorism’.8
 Shiffrin (1999).9
 For example, Heathwood (2006; forthcoming) defends the idea that one’s welfare is a function of the 10
satisfaction or frustration of one’s desires. If welfare just is what’s good, then pain is intrinsically bad, 
since it frustrates the good.
 McMahan (2006: 626).11
 “It is implausible to suppose that women who injure their fetus are then morally required, if other 12
things are equal, to kill it” (McMahan 2006: 646). 
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legislation to lead them to deny or discount the gravity of the wrong involved in prenatal injury” 
(635). 
13
This concern is misplaced. As I’ll argue, it results from insufficient attention to the rights and 
duties that flow from the expectant mother’s autonomous choices. Maternal autonomy has 
been central to discussion of the morality of pregnancy since at least Judith Thomson’s 
landmark “A Defense of Abortion” and almost certainly before. It is unsurprising, then, that 
autonomy also figures centrally in the morality of prenatal harm. Properly attending to the rights 
and duties that flow from maternal autonomy explains why the Right Explanation does not 
require mothers to abort fetuses that they have culpably injured.

I’ll start by clearing a space for maternal autonomy in discussions of the morality of prenatal 
harm by focusing on McMahan’s concerns about the Right Explanation. McMahan is misled by 
two cases in particular, which share some preliminary facts. Suppose that a pregnant woman 
has a condition that, if she forgoes treatment, will lead to chronic mild pain for the rest of her 
life. The condition can be treated in two ways but both threaten the fetus’ interests. Taking the 
Abortifacient Pill will cure her but injure and then painlessly kill the fetus. The Mutagenic Pill will 
cure her equally well but injure the fetus so that it will experience moderate chronic pain for rest 
of its life. 

In Three Choices, she has the option of forgoing treatment, in which case she would give birth 
to a baby who will not experience moderate chronic pain but she will experience mild chronic 
pain for the rest of her life. In Two Choices, however, this third choice is not an option. Rather, 
“her society is paternalistic, and the hospital will force her to take a pill but will allow her to 
decide which to take” (637). So she must choose between pills; she cannot forgo treatment. 

The central difference between the two cases is a difference in the mother’s options:

McMahan argues that, surprisingly, this difference affects what the woman may do in each 
case. In Three Choices, he writes that “it is impermissible for the woman to take [the Mutagenic 
Pill], which causes prenatal injury, but permissible for her to take [the Abortifacient Pill], which 
causes prenatal injury but then prevents the relevant effects from occurring by causing an 
Three Choices Two Choices
Option 1 Take the Abortifacient Pill, avoid a 
lifetime of chronic mild pain, injure 
then painlessly kill the fetus
Take the Abortifacient Pill, avoid a 
lifetime of chronic mild pain, injure 
then painlessly kill the fetus
Option 2 Take the Mutagenic Pill, avoid a 
lifetime of chronic mild pain, and 
cause the fetus to have a lifetime of 
moderate chronic pain
Take the Mutagenic Pill, avoid a 
lifetime of chronic mild pain, and 
cause the fetus to have a lifetime of 
moderate chronic pain
Option 3 Take neither pill and face a lifetime of 
mild chronic pain —
McMahan (2006) restates this point as part of a dilemma for legislation: “if legislation distinguishes 13
morally between lethal and nonlethal prenatal injury, it will establish perverse incentives [to abort]; but if it 
does not, and treats the killing of a fetus as a serious crime on a par with injuring it, it will pose a threat 
to abortion rights by implicitly assigning the fetus a higher moral status than it actually has” (655).
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abortion” (McMahan 2006: 636). This is because by choosing the Mutagenic Pill, the woman 
chooses moderate chronic pain for the fetus over mild chronic pain for herself, giving the fetus 
a strong future complaint when it becomes a child. The Abortifacient Pill lacks this implication, 
being an abortifacient. So taking the Abortifacient Pill is permissible whereas the Mutagenic Pill 
is not, even if the Mutagenic Pill is better for the fetus.

However, Two Choices is different, argues McMahan. According to him, she may not take the 
abortifacient in Two Choices even though she can take it in Three Choices. He writes:

Let us make the same assumptions about the woman’s preferences in [Two Choices] 
that we made in [Three Choices]. Where her own interests are concerned, this woman is 
neutral between the two pills because she finds the expected benefits to her of each pill 
to be about the same as those of the other. We may assume, therefore, that her 
interests will be unaffected by her choice; they will be equally well satisfied whichever 
choice she makes. Because her interests are not engaged, the only relevant question is 
what would be better for the fetus. Its interest in continuing to live, though weak, would 
be frustrated by [Abortifacient Pill] but not by [the Mutagenic Pill]. […] it is 
impermissible, given our assumptions, for the woman to choose [the Abortifacient Pill] 
and therefore morally required for her to choose [the Mutagenic Pill]. (McMahan 2006: 
638-9, emphasis mine)

According to McMahan, the woman must choose what’s in the fetus’s best interests because 
“her interests are not engaged”. The Mutagenic Pill is best for the fetus since a future of 
moderate chronic pain is better than death. So the mother must take it rather than the 
abortifacient.  
14
McMahan concedes that his position is paradoxical (calling it “the Pareto paradox”). However, 
as I will now argue, he is mistaken that the mother may not choose the Abortifacient Pill in Two 
Choices. There is no paradox. Confusion about this point comes from conflating (or ignoring) 
moral reasons grounded in a mother’s autonomous choices with those grounded in her 
interests.

2.2 Against McMahan’s Pareto Paradox 
McMahan’s key premise is that only the fetus’s interests matter in Two Choices. He accepts 
this because, by stipulation, the mother’s interests are “neutral between the two pills”. He 
writes:

The argument I sketched for the permissibility of abortion is often thought to appeal not 
just to considerations of interests but also, implicitly, to intuitions about a woman’s right 
to bodily autonomy and the fetus’s lack of a right to the use of her body. It has not been 
my intention to elicit such intuitions but I have made no effort to screen them out. The 
reason I have not is that they count equally in favor of the permissibility of abortion and 
the infliction of prenatal injury. (633)

McMahan’s stipulation strains credulity.  It is plausible only if we ignore the burdens of raising 15
a child with moderate chronic pain. But think about what it would be like to raise such a child, 
 Wasserman seems to concur: “a woman who is truly in equipoise about whether to carry that late 14
fetus should probably do so, since its time-relative interests in becoming a child and adult, however 
slight, are greater than nothing” (Wasserman 2005: 23).
 Thanks to Cami Koepke for raising this point.15
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the non-trivial costs, burdens, and responsibilities that come with raising someone who is in 
constant and considerable physical discomfort. It’s hard to imagine that these are mirrored by 
the costs to the woman of taking the abortifacient, particularly since McMahan does not 
describe those costs. At best, the intuitions that McMahan seeks to elicit are muddied by the 
case’s incomplete description.

But even granting McMahan’s stipulation, this is a deeper mistake. As I’ll now argue, the 
mother’s interests do not exhaust her moral claims.  In particular, we cannot ignore the moral 16
significance of the woman’s plans for her pregnancy, apart from the interests she promotes by 
pursuing those plans. What’s permissible in Two Choices, as we shall now see, depends on 
those plans or their absence, not just on her interests. 

Advocates of McMahan’s position may wish to resist the thesis that moral reasons grounded in 
an agent’s autonomy can diverge from moral reasons grounded her interests. They might do so 
by claiming that that interests comprise autonomy because the moral significance of choice is 
exhausted by the agent’s grounds for choice. But the thesis follows from two relatively 
uncontroversial claims. The first is that people can choose options that do not best promote 
their interests. McMahan seems to tacitly endorse this claim. It is entailed by claim that the 
woman ought to choose the Mutagenic Pill in Two Choices on the supposition that ought 
implies can. If she ought to choose the Mutagenic Pill, then she can choose that pill even if it’s 
(by stipulation) not better for her than the Abortifacient Pill.

The second assumption is that facts about what a person chooses for themselves provide 
moral reasons.  What we consent to, what we promise to do, and the social roles we choose 17
to inhabit are all choices under our volitional control that affect our normative landscape. As I’ll 
argue in the next section, whether or not a pregnant person chooses to parent affects choices 
like whether to take the Mutagenic Pill or the Abortifacient Pill. But more on that shortly.

These assumptions entail that a woman’s choices can conflict with her interests and that when 
they do, they can provide reasons that countervail those provided by some of her interests. For 
example, a pregnant person can choose to become a parent against their interests or choose 
not to become a parent even if that would ultimately benefit them. In either case, the person’s 
choice matters morally to some degree. It need not matter conclusively or decisively, being 
merely one moral consideration among many; I take no stand on that question. However, if a 
woman’s choice about motherhood affects whether she should take the Mutagenic Pill or the 
Abortifacient Pill then so long as we haven’t accounted for that choice in the final tally of moral 
reasons, we haven’t tallied all those reasons. By ignoring what the woman in Two Choices 
wants, McMahan ignores something morally important, which affects which pill to take. He 
argues himself into (what is, by his own lights) a paradoxical position simply by neglecting the 
moral import of maternal autonomy.

We can sharpen this point. McMahan’s protagonist can regard her pregnancy in three ways: 

(1) The pregnancy is wanted.

(2) The pregnancy is unwanted.

(3) The mother is undecided about the pregnancy.

 Roberts (2010: 108-17) also disputes McMahan’s claims about Two Choices on distinct grounds.16
 This is the core thesis of voluntarism — see Chang (2009). Humean hypotheticalists, as articulated and 17
defended by Schroeder (2007), can also explain and defend this claim.
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If (1), then it’s uncontroversial that she should not choose the Abortifacient Pill. But then all 
sides agree that she should not take the Abortifacient Pill in this case. That may be so because 
because of the fetus’s interests or it may be because she doesn’t want to or both. The case 
doesn’t help us decide between these claims.

If (2), then taking the Abortifacient Pill is permissible in Two Choices, not impermissible as 
McMahan contends. Although her interests are served equally well by both pills, since our 
interests don’t directly determine our choices, she may prefer not to be a mother. She may not, 
for example, value the kind of (genuine!) wellbeing or satisfaction that comes from parenthood. 
As L. A. Paul has argued, it’s extremely difficult — perhaps impossible — to appreciate the 
benefits  of becoming a parent before becoming one. In that case, she may take the 
Abortifacient Pill rather than the Mutagenic Pill. Choosing not to become a mother, it seems, 
gives a strong reason to terminate the pregnancy, which is grounded in her autonomy rather 
than her interests. As a consequence, the woman does nothing wrong in taking the 
abortifacient when she wants to avoid motherhood, even in cases like McMahan’s where she 
would be equally well off as a mother. Her mere choice to reject motherhood suffices to justify 
taking the abortifacient. 

Of course, she can consider the fetus’s interests in making her choice. If she finds those 
interests compelling, then she does not err in choosing the Mutagenic Pill. My claim is simply 
that if consideration of those interests fails to move her to choose the Mutagenic Pill and if her 
concerns about motherhood lead her to favour the Abortifacient, she does no wrong in 
choosing the latter. Only if one thinks, as McMahan does, that the fetus’s interests are strong 
enough to overcome the mother’s autonomous choice could she err. And, as we’ll see in the 
next section, the concerns that lead McMahan to inflate fetal interests are unfounded. 
If (3), then matters are less clear. The question is whether the mother is morally required to 
gestate absent a determinate desire to the contrary. Must she gestate even though she does 
not want to? Must she put the fetus’s interests first precisely because she is ambivalent or 
undecided? It seems doubtful that she must. If a woman is unsure about whether motherhood 
will be a blessing or a curse, the risk of the latter can outweigh the fetus’s present claims 
against abortion. The possibility of unwanted motherhood is a great physical, emotional, and 
social risk — greater, I suggest, than the fetus’s interests in survival, at least during early 
pregnancy. So if the mother is undecided about continuing the pregnancy, she has a powerful 
reason against taking the Mutagenic Pill. 

This may seem too quick. If she is uncertain, then the risk of a burdensome unwanted 
pregnancy is mirrored by the equal chance of a boon wanted pregnancy. Her powerful reason 
against taking the Mutagenic Pill is thus matched by a powerful reason against taking the 
Abortifacient Pill. So it may seem that when a pregnant person is ambivalent about her 
pregnancy, her reasons are in equipose — indeed, their balanced explains her ambivalence.

But, contrary to initial appearances, mirrored uncertainties can provide asymmetrical reasons. 
The mother may be risk averse, for example, preferring the status quo to a coin toss between 
proportionately good and bad outcomes. If she chooses to take the abortifacient out of risk 
aversion, she does nothing wrong, contra McMahan. 

What leads some to wrongly discount or ignore maternal autonomy? It seems that McMahan 
does so because, recall, “liberals must not allow their justified concern to protect the rights of 
pregnant women from intrusive legislation to lead them to deny or discount the gravity of the 
wrong involved in prenatal injury” (635). McMahan seems to presume that the only grounds for 
explaining the wrong involved in prenatal injury as illustrated in cases like the pregnant woman 
who loves contact sports — the wrong of making abortion an acceptable or even required 
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remedy to prenatal harm — involve fetal interests. In the subsequent section I’ll argue that we 
can appeal to maternal autonomy to explain why abortion is often an unacceptable remedy to 
prenatal harm. In short, McMahan concerns about failing to appreciate the gravity of “the 
wrong involved in prenatal injury” are unfounded. 

 




The preceding focused on the normative significance of what a woman chooses for herself 
and, in particular, on her choice to become a mother. Although I find it obvious that this choice, 
apart from the interests that it serves, is intrinsically morally significant, not all do. So I’ll add to 
my case for this claim with an analogy to a recent discussion from Joe Horton. The analogy will 
also allow us to answer McMahan’s concerns about attributing only weak interests to fetuses.

Other things equal, having a baby who will live a life of chronic moderate pain is impersonally 
better to than having no baby at all for the baby’s (albeit diminished) wellbeing contributes to 
the good. And, other things equal, having a baby who will not live a life of chronic moderate 
pain is obviously better than having one who will, other things equal. To illustrate these claims, 
suppose that the woman in Wasserman’s story is faced with the three following choices:

(1) Stop playing rugby and have a child who will live a relatively pain-free life.

(2) Play rugby and have a child who will live a life of chronic moderate pain.

(3) Play rugby and terminate the pregnancy.

Assuming that refraining from rugby for the duration of the pregnancy harms the woman’s 
interests less than a lifetime of chronic moderate pain harms the fetus’s interests, (1) is 
impersonally better than (2) which is impersonally better than (3). But only (1) and (3) are 
permissible. This is puzzling. If (3) is worse than (2) and (3) is permissible then (2) should be too. 

Nevertheless, common intuitions forbid the woman from pursuing (2). Perhaps those intuitions 
are mistaken, as Flanigan (2020) contends, but if we don’t forbid (2) somehow, we get the 
problem of abortion as a remedy to prenatal harm.  So it seems that the middling option, (2), is 18
puzzlingly impermissible despite being better for the woman than (1), which is permissible, and 
better for the fetus than (3), which is also permissible. What could explain this?

 Intuitions about the impermissibility of prenatal harm can be doubted. Flanigan (2020) writes that 18
“popular intuitions about pregnancy are potentially colored by unjustified prejudices. Drug users, 
disabled people, obese people, poor people, and women—especially women who have sex—have 
historically been denounced for their permissible choices when denouncement was unwarranted. These 
considerations debunk or at least call into question intuitions that prenatal injury is criticizable” (16). 

However, these intuitions cannot be debunked strictly on gender lines. For example, just as a willing 
mother should refrain from smoking if her smoking sufficiently harms the fetus, so too should a willing 
father refrain from smoking if his smoking sufficiently harms the fetus. Now, smoking may fall under 
Flanigan’s category of drug use. But these intuitions persist even absent drug use. Suppose that a 
willing father’s profession requires him to handle chemicals that endanger fetuses and that the father 
likes to work from home since it saves him from a long and expensive commute. It seems to me that, 
when living with a pregnant person, he cannot handle the chemicals from home given his intention to 
parent despite the inconvenience of the long, expensive commute. This intuition cannot be debunked 
with Flanigan’s observations.
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The key lies in the fact that the problem is a special case of a more general one. Identifying the 
problem’s most general form and its solution allows us to apply that solution to the problem of 
abortion as a remedy to prenatal harm. Horton (2017) presents a case with a similar structure. 
Suppose that two children are trapped in a collapsing building. You can save both (or either) at 
the expense of your arms being crushed. Or you can do nothing, allowing the children to die 
but saving your arms. Given this story, the following seem plainly true:

(4) It is morally permissible for you not to the save the children.

(5) It is morally wrong for you to save just one child.

As Horton writes, “(4) is plausible because of the sacrifice that saving the children requires. (5) 
is plausible because saving both children requires no greater sacrifice than saving only one” 
(94). However, given the background facts, (4) and (5) imply:

(6) You ought to save neither child rather than save only one. 

This implication is odd. After all, saving one child is impersonally better than saving none. 
Horton continues:

Surely the best moral view would not discourage you from saving the one child. This is 
just one instance of a more general problem. There are many cases in which, by making 
some great sacrifice, you could bring about either a good outcome or an even better 
outcome. In some of these cases, it is very plausible both that it is permissible for you 
to bring about neither outcome and that it is wrong for you to bring about the less good 
outcome. But together, these claims seem to imply that you ought to bring about 
neither outcome rather than the less good outcome. And that seems very 
counterintuitive. We can call this The All or Nothing Problem. (Horton 2017: 94)

His solution conditions certain obligations on our willingness to make the relevant sacrifices.  19
If we are unwilling to sacrifice our arms to save the children, then we may refrain from saving 
them. But if we are willing to make that sacrifice to save one child, we cannot claim that the 
price of sacrifice is a strong enough reason not to save the other child. So if we are willing to 
save one, we must save both. Consequently, Horton rejects (4). The permission not to save the 
children is not unconditional. It holds only when one is unwilling to sacrifice one’s arms.

The general shape of Horton’s solution applies to the choice between (1-3). In both Horton’s 
case and Wasserman’s story, the impersonally best option (save both children; stop rugby to 
have the baby) is merely permissible but not required since it involves great sacrifice (the 
sacrifice of both arms; the sacrifices involved in parenthood). Moreover, Horton’s (6) closely 
resembles the problem of abortion as a remedy to prenatal injury. Consider:

(6) You ought to save neither child rather than save only one. 

The general form of the claim is “you ought to do [what’s worst] rather than [what’s middling 
but objectionable]”. In Horton’s case, what’s worst is saving neither child and what’s middling 
 “When bringing about an outcome O would require us to make a great sacrifice S, we can normally 19
appeal to S as an adequate justification for not bringing about O. But if we are willing to make a sacrifice 
that is not significantly smaller than S to bring about an outcome that is not significantly better than O, 
and we do not have adequate agent-relative reasons to favour this other outcome, we cannot reasonably 
appeal to S as a justification for not bringing about O. So if there is no other adequate justification for not 
bringing about O, we ought to bring about O.” (Horton 2017: 98)
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but objectionable is saving only one. In Wasserman’s case, what’s worst is abortion and what’s 
middling but objectionable is prenatal injury. Substituting like for like yields:

(7) You ought to terminate the pregnancy rather than injure the child.

And this looks like precisely the kind of claim that leads to worries about abortion as a remedy 
to prenatal harm.

Finally, saving both of the children and continuing to gestate without harming the fetus are 
ordinarily supererogatory. Indeed, this observation is the foundation of Flanigan (2020) defense 
of the general permissibility of prenatal harm. However, if Horton’s argument is sound, then 
being willing to perform the supererogatory enjoins new obligations, which conflict with the 
general permissibility of prenatal harm. Just as being willing to save one child requires one to 
save both, being willing to bear the child means refraining from contact sports, contra Flanigan.

Thus, Wasserman’s protagonist can justify her choice to play rugby only if she is unwilling to 
make the sacrifices involved in having a child. However, if she is willing to make them, then she 
cannot use the burdens of pregnancy as justification against the claims of the fetus. Because 
she intends to carry the fetus — recall, “consider [a woman who] loves contact sports, and 
continues to participate despite her intention to bear the fetus and her knowledge that those 
sports place it at grave risk of impairment” (27) — she violates a duty to the fetus to protect it 
from harm. Were she willing to terminate her pregnancy, she would lack this obligation.

What is this obligation's strength? Surely some risks during pregnancy are acceptable. Mothers 
need not sacrifice everything to avoid an iota of harm to the fetus. Nevertheless, if popular 
intuitions about the morality of prenatal harm are probative, at least some harms to the fetus by 
willing mothers are impermissible. So we must draw a line between sacrifices that are required 
by parenthood to avoid a particular harm and ones that are not. But as Flanigan writes, “it is 
difficult to draw [this] line, since all pregnancies involve some level of avoidable risk” (2020: 15).

It’s natural to tie the obligation’s strength to the degree of harm at risk. In the case immediately 
above, the harm in question is a lifetime of chronic moderate pain, which, it seems to me, is 
harmful enough to forbid the woman from playing rugby for the duration of the pregnancy. We 
can generalize the account in a rough fashion to accommodate greater and lesser harms: if the 
harm done to a child by activity X forbids the mother from doing X, even if it requires sacrifice Y 
then, if she is willing to be a parent to the fetus and X would cause the fetus similar harm, then 
she is also forbidden from pursuing X even if requires sacrifice Y. As a result, if the harm done 
to a child by second-hand smoke requires the mother to quit, and if second-hand smoke 
causes similar harm to the fetus, then the mother is similarly required to quit smoking during 
pregnancy. However, if a mother is not morally required to sacrifice her arm to prevent her 
child’s leg paralysis, then she may forgo a treatment during pregnancy required for her fetus to 
walk when it becomes a child if the treatment will cost her her arm.

3.2 Two Possible Explanations of Voluntarist Parental Role Obligations 
We must not underestimate what it takes to be genuinely willing to parent, at least in the sense 
that I intend. Willing parenthood is not a mere passing fancy or a phase. Consider the analogy 
above. To be under an obligation to save the children, in Horton’s case, you have to be 
resolutely willing to lose your arms. A would-be hero who charges in with the aim of saving the 
children but who faints or flees at the first flame hasn’t fallen short of her obligations. You are 
not required save the children if you are unwilling (even if you overestimate your own courage). 
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Likewise, even if you fancy being a parent, you don’t count as willing to be a parent, at least on 
my usage, unless you’re also willing to accept the sacrifices, challenges, and demands of 
parenthood. As Kant writes in the Groundwork, “whoever wills the end also wills the 
indispensably necessary means to it that is in his control” (4:417). As any parent will attest, you 
can parent only if you sacrifice. So whoever wills parenthood on themselves also wills the 
sacrifices that partly constitute parenthood. 
20
A willingness to sacrifice could change our obligations in two ways: it could add a reason for, 
for example, saving the second child or refraining from rugby or it could remove a reason 
against doing those things. In both cases, a willingness to sacrifice improves the moral case for 
doing them. The first explanation holds that, for example, your willingness to sacrifice your 
arms to save the first child is a reason to save the second. This tips the balance of reasons 
from merely permitting one to save the second child to positively requiring that one does. 
Similarly, a woman’s willingness to become a parent is a reason to protect the fetus from harm. 
When a woman is unwilling to be a parent, she lacks this reason — thats part of what makes 
abortion permissible.

The second way is through undercutting defeat. A fact can be a reason to do something only 
contingently. For example, the fact that the wall appears red is a reason to believe that it’s red. 
But that fact’s status as a reason can be undercut: if you learn that you’re wearing red-tinted 
goggles, then the fact that the wall appears red ceases to be a reason to believe that it's red. It 
is undercut by the fact that you’re wearing red-tinted goggles.

The reason against saving either child is that it will cost you your arms. However, according to 
this first explanation, a willingness to lose your arms to save one child undercuts the sacrifice’s 
status as a reason against saving the second. When you’re willing to sacrifice to save one 
child, there is, literally speaking, no reason for you not to save the other. So the second child’s 
interests in being saved are decisive. Similarly, your willingness to bear the burdens of 
parenthood undercuts the reason against the fetus’s interests provided by those burdens. If 
you’re willing to parent the child, then you have no answer to the fetus’s complaint against the 
harm you will cause to it by engaging in contact sports. Your answer is undercut by your 
willingness to be a parent.

These two explanations paint different pictures of the grounds of parental obligations. The first 
explanation is agent-centered, where the grounds of the mother’s obligation to protect the 
fetus lie in her attitudes, particularly her willingness to be a parent. The second explanation is 
patient-centered, where the grounds of the mother’s obligation lie, ultimately, in the fetus’s 
interests. According to the second explanation, the mother’s willingness to parent explains why 
she is particularly responsible for discharging the obligation to protect the fetus but it does not 
explain the obligation itself, which obtains because of the fetus’s interests.

 Margaret Little (1999) makes similar points about the moral significance of ‘deeper relationships’ 20
between parent and child, beyond the biological claims “that provide children with a moral claim that the 
person so related be open toward developing a deeper relationship” (308).
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We need not decide between these explanations.  They are compatible, perhaps each 21
capturing a piece of the truth. In either case, the woman’s willingness to be a parent grounds a 
duty to protect the fetus from harm. Consequently, advocates of the Right Explanation should 
respond to concerns about abortion as a remedy for prenatal harm, such as those raised by 
McMahan and Wasserman, inter alia, by appreciating that some parental duties originate in a 
woman’s willingness to parent. That is, the full explanation of why the woman in Wasserman’s 
story acts wrongly lies in the special duties she incurs by choosing to parent. Given that 
choice, she cannot use the burdens of pregnancy, such as refraining from contact sports, as 
reasons against the fetus’s interests. The fetus’s interests “win out” in that case not because of 
their relative strength, McMahan seems to suggest, but because the woman’s decision to bear 
the fetus limits her claims against it

Challenges to this proposal originate in cases where prenatal harm is seemingly impermissible 
but willing parenthood is absent. Such cases seem to show that the proposal is too weak to 
explain the impermissibility of prenatal harm in cases like Wasserman’s. Fortunately, these 
cases can be rebutted.

Since a willingness to parent is harder to satisfy that it may appear at first, many parents don’t 
genuinely will parenthood. Do they lack the corresponding duties? No. The duties of (unwilling) 
parents of children don’t evaporate wholesale; they simply have different grounds. Unwilling 
parents may have duties to children who are in their care simply because they’re uniquely 
positioned to care for them. But unwilling parents are the kind of parents who lose their rights. 
The main duty of a sufficiently unwilling parent may be to find loving adoptive parents for their 
child. 

Likewise, unwilling pregnant mothers have fewer duties than their willing counterparts. If 
Wasserman’s protagonist is not a willing parent, perhaps because she is resolutely unwilling to 
give up rugby to protect her fetus, then there is cause for her to terminate the pregnancy, 
particularly before she causes her fetus harm. But this could hardly be called pressure to abort 
the fetus to remedy that harm. She isn’t a willing mother who, filled with regret for injuring her 
fetus, feels compelled to terminate her pregnancy to avoid the future child’s complaint. The 
pressure to terminate the pregnancy comes primarily from the fact that the woman does not 
genuinely want to be a mother because of the sacrifices involved, regardless of whether she 
has harmed her fetus. 
Surrogates, for example, become pregnant without the intention to parent the fetus, so the 
proposed account seemingly fails to explain why it’s wrong for surrogates, for example, to play 
contact sports when pregnant. However, the impermissibility of prenatal harm in those cases 
can be explained by the surrogate’s duty to protect the fetus on behalf of the adoptive parents. 
The adoptive parents have a duty to the fetus in virtue of their intention to parent. The 
surrogate is the parents’ agent, acquiring their parental duties. So the surrogate has a 
derivative duty to protect the fetus in virtue of her arrangement with the adoptive parents.

 Because the patient-centered approach resembles Harman (1999)’s Actual Future view, it may be 21
vulnerable to similar worries. For example, suppose that, unbeknownst to her, Wasserman’s protagonist 
will suffer a miscarriage unrelated to her love of contact sports. As such, unbeknownst to her, her fetus 
does not actually have a future. Harman’s view and the patient-centered approach seem to imply that 
Wasserman’s protagonist can engage in contact sports, even if she fully intends to carry the fetus to 
term. I find that counterintuitive. The agent-centered approach does not have this implication. Harman 
briefly touches on something close to this point on p.316 and again on p.319, writing, “The Actual Future 
Principle does not hold us to standards we cannot meet.” But this does not respond to the worry just 
sketched. Surely Wasserman’s protagonist can meet the standard of avoiding contact sports.
Page  of 13 19
Consider a  different challenge. Suppose that the woman in Wasserman’s story is pregnant but, 
unlike in the story, she does not intend to become a mother. She is scheduled to terminate the 
pregnancy on Friday, but she has a rugby game on Thursday. Can she play?

According to the account, whether she can play depends on whether her claim to playing 
rugby, as an exercise of her autonomy, is stronger than the fetus’s claim against harm. Both 
claims can vary in strength. Perhaps it’s the World Cup of Rugby championship match — her 
life’s project — then it may be permissible for her to play. Similarly, if the fetus is sufficiently 
advanced to feel pain, then the fetus’s claims may outweigh the woman’s. In any case, what 
this woman does is less objectionable than what Wasserman’s protagonist does, since only the 
latter has a parental role obligation to protect the fetus. Moreover, when she seeks the 
abortion, she cannot be described as seeking an abortion to remedy harm to the fetus incurred 
during sports. She wants to terminate the pregnancy tout court. It just so happens that she 
cannot do so before risking harm to the fetus.

4. Voluntarism About Parental Duties

Horton writes that “because what we ought to do does not normally depend on what we are 
willing to do, [his solution to the all-or-nothing problem] might seem counterintuitive” (97). 
Perhaps he’s right, but the idea that what we ought to do as parents depends on whether we’re 
willing to be parents is independently plausible. Indeed, many philosophers argue on 
independent grounds that, roughly, intentions to parent suffice for possessing certain parental 
role obligations.  These ‘voluntarist’ accounts contrast with causal accounts according to 22
which parental rights and duties derive from causing someone  to exist. Consequently, the 
solution to the problem of prenatal harm that I’ve proposed offers extra support to these 
voluntarists about parental duties and enjoys additional support from them.

Voluntarism about parenthood can be divided along two axes: first, whether the intention to 
parent is sufficient or necessary (or both) for parenthood and, second, whether the intention to 
parent grounds the rights or duties (or both) of parenthood. The more controversial dimensions 
of voluntarism involve the distinct ideas that intentions to parent suffice for the rights of 
parenthood (since rights enable desires) and that such intentions are necessary for the duties 
of parenthood (since duties curtail desires).  The account defended here supports only the 23
limited claim that the intention to parent suffices for certain duties of parenthood. Although it 
supports only a limited form of voluntarism, this is not a trivial form of voluntarism for not all 
role-based obligations have voluntarist roots. For example, I can’t be sanctioned for Exxon’s 
many wrongdoings in virtue of wanting to be its CEO. But I can be sanctioned for harm to my 
child in virtue of wanting to be their parent.

Nevertheless, it is plausible that the rights and duties associated with a special role stand or fall 
together. I find it appealing to think that they are mutually entailing since the role is constituted 
by those special rights and duties. Consequently, the account defended here provides qualified 
support for a full-blooded voluntarism where the intention to parent is necessary and sufficient 
for the duties and rights associated with parenthood.

Finally, the proposed account and its analogy with the All-or-Nothing Problem illuminates not 
one but two potential explanations of why voluntarism about parental role obligations is true. 
 For discussion of ‘voluntarism’ or ‘intentionalism’ about parenthood, see Hill (1991), Bayne and 22
Kohlers (2001; 2003), Brake (2005; 2010), Pearson (2010), Wasserman (2009), DeGrazia (2017), and 
Richards (2017).
 For criticism, see, e.g., Prusak (2011a; 2011b). For defense, see Brake (2010).23
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The first explanation is agent-centered in the sense that it explains why there is a duty to 
protect the fetus in the first place using facts about the agent. In this case, the fact that the 
agent is willing to be a parent grounds certain parental role obligations, particularly the duty to 
protect the fetus from harm. 

An important challenge for this account is explaining why duties grounded in the particularities 
of one’s will are moral. After all, such duties will vary from agent to agent as a function of 
differences between what those agents are willing to do or be. So these duties will be so-called 
partial or agent-relative duties.  However, moral duties are thought to be impartial or agent-24
neutral — think of the categoricity of Kant’s categorical imperative or the universality of Parfit 
and Nagel’s agent-neutral reasons.  As a result, advocates of the agent-centered approach 25
face the challenge of explaining why parental role obligations are genuinely moral obligations, 
as they seem to be, instead of merely rational obligations such as the obligation to, for 
example, pursue the necessary means to one’s ends.

This is reason to consider the second, patient-centered account of parental role obligations 
sketched above. The challenge for such accounts is explaining why parental role obligations 
vary between persons if facts about the patients of such obligations do not. For example, from 
both my perspective and yours the facts about my child are the same. But only I, it seems, 
have obligations to my child. How is that possible if the obligation, which varies between 
agents, is grounded in facts about the child, which do not vary? How can I possess and you 
lack a special obligation to my child if that obligation to is grounded in facts about the child?

The second account allows that everyone has a prima facie duty to protect my child from harm, 
even if that involves great sacrifice. However, you have a special excuse that exempts you from 
fulfilling those duties: you’re not willing to parent that child. That excuse explains why you are 
not required to make the same sacrifices that I am to protect the child from harm. Conversely, 
because I am willing to parent my child, I have no such excuse when I fail to prevent harm to 
that child. So I am particularly liable to an obligation to protect them and you are not. 

This paints a very different picture of the nature of parental role obligations than the agent-
centered account. According to it, there is reason for everyone to protect my child from harm 
even if that involves great sacrifice. So seemingly partial duties, such parental duties, are 
actually impartial. The reason why it seems that only parents of a child have these demanding 
parental duties is that the parents lack an excuse for not fulfilling them that everyone else has. 
In a certain sense, non-parents of a child are ‘shielded’ from their agent-neutral, impartial 
obligations to that child by their unwillingness to parent them. In other words, non-parents, in 
virtue of being non-parents, always have a strong excuse from parental role obligations to 
others’ children. While this account is more complex than the agent-centered account, it has 
the advantage of allowing that parental role obligations are agent-neutral obligations, which is 
consistent with parental role obligations being moral obligations.

As I mention above, although each account suffices to explain why a willingness to parent 
leads to certain parental role obligations, we needn’t choose between them. They are 
compatible. Consequently, rather than competitors, they are complementary tools in the 
voluntarist’s toolbox, expanding the range of grounds for various voluntarist obligations of 
which parental role obligations are a special case.

 For example, Sidgwick (1874) and Moore (1903) argue that consequentialism and partial duties are 24
incompatible. Their incompatibility can be traced to the fact that facts about value are agent-neutral but 
partial duties are not.
 See Nagel (1970) and Parfit (1984).25
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5. Conclusion

I began with the observation that prenatal harm seems objectionable in a way that similar 
harms are not — that while you should risk an individual’s moderate permanent harm rather 
than their death, expectant mothers, when faced with that choice, may seemingly risk either. I 
sharpened this observation with a dilemma from McMahan (2006): if a fetus’s claim against 
prenatal harm is only weak, then it seems we have an obligation to abort the fetus to remedy 
that harm. However, if a fetus’s claim against prenatal harm is strong, then abortion is less 
permissible than many maintain.  

I argued that we can embrace the first horn of the dilemma by connecting the wrongness of 
prenatal harm to duties arising from the intention to parent. I motivated this connection first by 
criticizing McMahan’s account for failing to appreciate the connection between maternal 
autonomy and prenatal harm and then by drawing an analogy to Horton’s all-or-nothing puzzle. 
According to the view defended here, prenatal harm is especially wrong when it violates the 
voluntarist duty of a parent towards the wellbeing of their child. This account allows us to 
explain why prenatal harm is often particularly wrong while avoiding worries about using 
abortion as a remedy to prenatal harm.  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